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Abstract
Two salient features of modern economic growth are the rise in aggregate
savings rates and the steady increase in life expectancy. This paper links these
processes, showing that under certain conditions economic theory supports the
hypothesis that increased longevity leads to higher aggregate savings in steady
state. The analysis is based on a lifecycle model with uncertain longevity in
which individuals choose an optimum consumption path and a retirement age.
Conditions on the age-specic pattern of improvements in survival probabili-
ties are shown to ensure that individual savings rise with longevity and that
aggregation preserves this result. Population theory (Coale (1972)) is used to
link the steady-state age density function and the populations growth rate to
individualssurvival probabilities. The importance of a competitive annuity
market in avoiding unintended bequests is underscored.
JEL Classication: D1, D6, E2, H0.
Key Words: Longevity, Annuities, Lifecycle Savings, Retirement Age,
Steady-State, Aggregate Savings, Population Age Density Function.
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1 Introduction
A salient feature of modern economic growth is the increase in aggregate savings
rates, reected in the rise of capital-income ratios1. During 1820 - 1992, non-
residential capital in the US grew at 4.1 percent per annum, compared with
GDP growth of 3.6 percent (Kinugasa and Mason (2007)). Consequently, the
ratio of gross non-residential capital to GDP increased more than fourfold,
from .71 to 3.02 (Maddison (1995)). The experience in the UK and Japan is
similar. Even more pronounced, over a shorter period, were the high savings
rates and capital deepening in Asian countries (Lee, Mason and Miller (2001),
Deaton and Paxson (2000)).
Parallel to the increase in savings rates there was a steady rise in life
expectancy. Mortality has fallen substantially in the past hundred years: in
1900, about 2.5 people per hundred died in the US and the UK in a typical
year. Today mortality is two-thirds lower. As Cutler (2004) points out, the
trend of declining mortality has three distinct phases. Early in the twentieth
century there has been a signicant drop in infant mortality due to improved
nutrition and improvement in health conditions. This was followed by a major
reduction in mortality rates of adults due to infections diseases: "until the
1950s there was no evidence in any society of people reducing mortality from
chronic diseases of old age... and then cardiovascular disease mortality started
declining extremely rapidly" (Cutler (2004, page 8). In recent decades, the
rise of longevity is concentrated in life lengthening of the old due to medical
advances.
The objective of this paper is to analyze whether economic theory supports
the hypothesis, suggested in a number of empirical studies (see below), that the
rise in aggregate savings rates was largely driven by higher life expectancy. It
is shown that under certain conditions on the pattern of survival improvements
the answer is positive. The analysis is based on a lifecycle model with uncertain
longevity and on explicit aggregation of individualsresponse functions. Two
e¤ects are recognized and analyzed in detail:
1Naturally, aggregate savings in absolute terms are expected to increase with the growth
of population (due, say, to higher longevity, birth rates or other reasons).
2
(a) Behavioral E¤ects
An increase in survival probabilities a¤ects individualsconsumption and re-
tirement decisions. One has to identify the patterns of mortality declines that
lead individuals to increase their savings, taking into account the response of
endogenously chosen retirement ages. For example, when survival probabili-
ties increase mainly at older ages, individuals are expected to save more during
their working years in order to support a longer retirement. Although in this
case retirement age is also shown to rise with longevity, this compensates only
partially for the need to decrease consumption. The opposite response can be
expected when survival probabilities rise mainly for adults in their early life.
Demonstrating the dependence of individualsresponses on the age related pat-
tern of improvements in survival probabilities is particularly pertinent in view
of the uneven history of age-specic declines in mortality rates outlined above.
(b) Age Composition E¤ects
An increase in survival probabilities changes the populations age density func-
tion. The direction of this change depends on which of two opposite e¤ects
dominates. First, an increase in survival rates raises the size of all age co-
horts, some more than others depending on the specication of the age related
improvements in survival probabilities. Second, with given age-specic birth
rates, an increase in survival probabilities raises the populations growth rate.
A higher growth rate, in turn, increases the relative weight of younger age
groups. Since older ages are typically retirees who are dissavers while younger
ages are workers who save towards retirement, the rst e¤ect tends to reduce
aggregate savings while the second e¤ect raises savings. Conditions provided
below ensure that the latter e¤ect is dominant.
The dynamics of demographic processes generated by a change in survival
probabilities is quite complex. There exists, however, a well developed theory
of the dependence of steady-state age density distributions on the underlying
parameters (e.g. Coale (1972)). Building on this theory, we shall study the
long-run e¤ects of changes in longevity on aggregate savings, taking into ac-
count endogenous changes in the age density function.
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Starting with Yaaris (1965) seminal work, a number of papers analyzed
the e¤ects of rising life expectancy on individual savings (e.g. Leung (1994),
Bloom and Canning (2003), Zilcha and Friedman (1985), Kinugasa and Mason
(2007)). These papers study the response of individuals to changes in longevity
but none provides a general characterization of the pattern of age-specic im-
provements in survival probabilities that lead to an increase in individual sav-
ings. Furthermore, these works do not incorporate endogenous changes in the
chosen retirement age due to changes in longevity.
The e¤ects of a longevity increase on aggregate savings have been explored
empirically or by simulations in a number of the above and other papers (e.g.
Miles (1999), Deaton and Paxson (2000) and Lee, Mason and Miller (2001)).
All these papers nd a positive correlation between longevity and aggregate
savings but, in the absence of explicit aggregation of individuals response
functions it is impossible to identify the underlying factors which determine
the direction of the age composition e¤ects.
This paper performs two tasks: rst, it derives individual response func-
tions based on a model of individual lifetime decisions about consumption and
retirement in the presence of longevity risks with access to a competitive annu-
ity market. Second, it aggregates individualsresponse functions, linking their
survival functions with the steady-state population age density function.
Existence of a competitive annuity market is crucial for individual deci-
sions on savings and retirement. In the absence of this market, these decisions
have to take into account the existence of unintended bequests, that is, as-
sets left at death because individuals do not want to outlive their resources.
In these circumstances, uncertain lifetime generates a random distribution of
bequests which become initial endowments for a subsequent generation. A
general analysis of the long-term e¤ects of longevity changes on the ergodic
distribution of these bequests and endowments is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. Section 7, however, provides an example of savings and random bequests
in the absence of annuities. Not surprisingly, in this case the direction of the
e¤ect of a rise in longevity cannot generally be ascertained.
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2 A Simple Life-Cycle Model With Uncertain
Survival
Consider a simple individual life-cycle model with uncertain survival. At age
0; the probability of surviving to age z is F (z) : F (0) = 1, and F 0(z)  0;
z  0: There may be a nite age T > 0 for which F (T ) = 0; but this is not
necessary2.
Individuals derive instantaneous utility u(c) (u0 > 0, u00 < 0); independent
of age, from consumption, c, and can decide to work or retire (disregarding the
choice of labor intensity). Work is normalized to a level of unity.
Disutility from work at age z, e(z) > 0; is assumed to be independent
of consumption and, in order to ensure that work precedes retirement, non-
decreases with age (e0(z)  0). In the absence of time-preference, expected
lifetime utility, V , is therefore
V =
1Z
0
u(c(z))F (z)dz  
RZ
0
e(z)F (z)dz (1)
where c(z) is consumption at age z and R is the age of retirement.
Let a(z) be the amount of annuities held by an age z individual3. Then
the dynamic budget constraint is
_a(z) = r(z)a(z) + w(z)  c(z) (2)
where _a(z) is the amount of annuities purchased (> 0) or sold (< 0); r(z)
is the instantaneous rate of return on annuities and w(z) is the wage rate
(w(z) = 0 for z > R) of an age z individual. It is assumed that w(z) non-
increases in z. As shown below, this assumption ensures that the individual
2A commonly used function is F (z) =
e z   e T
1  e T ( > 0 constant) dened over 0 
z  T: Its limit is the exponential, lim
T!1
F (z) = e z:
3We know from Yaari (1965) that when longevity is the only uncertainty then rational
individuals will annuitize all their assets. The modications required when individuals have
a positive time preference and/or there is a positive rate of interest on non-annuitized assets
are well-known and have no impact on the following analysis.
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will choose a working phase followed by a retirement phase. Solving (2) for a
given consumption path, c(z); the holdings for annuities at age z are
a(z) = e
zR
0
r(x)dx zR
0
e
 
xR
0
r(h)dh
(w(x)  c(x))dx (3)
with a(0) = 0:
In a competitive annuity market equilibrium, the rate of return on annu-
ities is equal to the Hazard-Rate, the conditional probability of dying at age
z
r(z) =  d lnF (z)
dz
=
f(z)
F (z)
(4)
where f(z) =  dF (z)
dz
is the probability of dying at age z4.
From (3), (4) and the transversality condition lim
z!1
a(z) e
 
zR
0
r(x)dx
= 0; we
obtain the lifetime budget constraint
1Z
0
c(z)F (z)dz  
RZ
0
w(z)F (z)dz = 0; (5)
Thus, equilibrium condition (4) implies that expected consumption is equal
to expected wages, that is, zero expected prots. Maximization of (1) s.t.(5)
yields constant optimum consumption and an optimum retirement age which
satisfy
c =
RR
0
w(z)F (z)dz
z
(6)
u0(c)w(R)  e(R) = 0 (7)
where z =
1R
0
F (z)dz is expected lifetime5. We denote the solution to (6) - (7)
by (c; R): Inserting (6) into (7), it is seen that the solution (c; R) is unique
4See Sheshinski (2007).
5Integrating by parts, z =
1R
0
zf(z)dz.
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if the rst term in (7) strictly decreases with R: For this, the assumption that
w0(z)  0 is a su¢ cient condition6.
Condition (6) makes optimum consumption equal to expected wages di-
vided by expected lifetime. Condition (7) equates the marginal benets and
costs of a small postponement of retirement.
Individual savings at age z, s(z), are positive during the working phase
and negative during retirement:
s(z) =
(
w(z)  c; 0  z  R
  c; R < z <1 (8)
In the absence of a bequest motive, expected savings over the whole life-
time are zero:
1R
0
s(z)F (z)dz = 0:
3 E¤ects of Longevity Changes on Individual
Decisions
Suppose that the survival function depends on a parameter denoted , F (z; ),
representing longevity. We take a decrease in  to cause an upward shift in
survival probabilities,
@F (z; )
@
< 0, at all ages, z > 07. Obviously, expected
lifetime, z() =
1R
0
F (z; )dz; decreases with :
Denote by (z; ) the proportional change in the survival function at age
z due to a change in : (z; ) =
1
F (z; )
@F (z; )
@
(< 0): Di¤erentiating (3)
partially w.r.t. , holding R constant, yields
1
c
@c
@
= '(R; ) (9)
6For an interior solution when T is nite, it is su¢ cient to assume that e(z) strictly
increases from zero to 1 as z rises from zero to T .
7Of course, F (0; ) = 1 for any . If the e¤ect of a change in  on F (z; ) is continuous,
the implication is that the e¤ect of a change in  around z = 0 is small. See Assumption 1
below. When there is a nite T for which F (T; ) = 0, T depends on . In view of the rise
in survival probabilities at very old ages, this is an expected outcome.
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where
'(R; ) =
RR
0
(z; )F (z; )dz
RR
0
F (z; )dz
 
1R
0
(z; )F (z; )dz
1R
0
F (z; )dz
(10)
Clearly, lim
R!1
'(R; ) = 0. Hence, when
@'
@R
(R; )  0 ( 0) (with
strict inequality for some R), then '(R; ) > 0 (< 0) for all R.
We have
@'(R; )
@R
=
F (R)
RR
0
F (z; )dz
RZ
0
[(R; )  (z; )]F (z; )dz (11)
The following assumption ensures that (11) is negative:
Assumption 1. (z; ) non-increases in z;
@(z; )
@z
 0; for all z:
This assumption has a straightforward interpretation: improvements in
survival rates are proportionately larger at later ages. It is equivalent to as-
suming that an increase in  raises the Hazard-Rate8.
It follows from (10) and (11) that under Assumption 1,
@c
@
> 0. That is,
an increase in longevity, holding retirement age constant, decreases consump-
tion. Note that when (z; ) non-decreases in z; then
@c
@
< 0. When increases
in survival probabilities are proportionately larger at early ages compared to
later ages then, as could be expected, individuals increase consumption (and
decrease savings).
The e¤ect of a change in survival probabilities on optimum retirement is
obtained by totally di¤erentiating (6) (7) w.r.t. . In elasticity form:
8According to a standard denition of Stochastic Dominance (see Sheshinski (2007)),
when this assumption is satised then a survival function with a lower  stochastically
dominates any survival function with a higher :
Note that the function in f.n. 2 above satises Assumption 1 (for any T ).
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R
dR
d
=  


c
@c
@

R
c
@c
@R
+
Re0(R)
e(R)
(12)
where  =  u
00(c)c
u0(c)
> 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
From (6),
R
c
@c
@R
=
F (R; )R
RR
0
F (z; )dz
. Since F non-increases in z, it is seen that
0 <
R
c
@c
@R
< 1. Hence,
dR
d
Q 0 , @c

@
R 0.
The total change in consumption is, using (12),
dc
d
=
@c
@R
(
dR
Rd
) +
@c
@
=
0BB@
Re0(R)
e(R)

R
c
@c
@R
+
Re0(R)
e(R)
1CCA @c@ : (13)
By Assumption 1, an increase in longevity increases the optimum retire-
ment age, but this only partially compensates for the required decrease in con-
sumption (and, correspondingly, the increase in savings) and hence,
dc
d
> 0.
We summarize the analysis so far:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, an increase in longevity increases opti-
mum retirement,
dR
d
< 0, and decreases optimum consumption,
dc
d
> 0.
It is of interest to nd the e¤ect of a change in  on optimum lifetime
utility, V  = u(c)z  
RR
0
e(z)F (z; )dz.
By the envelope theorem, (3) (4), (6) and (7),
dV 
d
=
@V 
@
= [u(c)  u0(c)c]
1Z
0
@F (z; )
@
dz +
+
RZ
0
[e(R)  e(z)]@F (z; )
@
dz (14)
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Strict concavity of u(c) and the assumption that e0(z)  0 ensure that
dV 
d
< 0. An increase in longevity always increases welfare9.
4 Longevity Changes and Aggregate Savings
Suppose that the population grows at a constant rate, g. The steady-state age
density function of the population, denoted h(z; ; g), is given by10
h(z; ; g) = me gzF (z; ) (15)
where m =
1
1Z
0
e gzF (z; )dz
is the birth rate.
The growth rate g, in turn, is determined by the second fundamental
equation of stable population theory:
1Z
0
e gzF (z; )b(z)dz = 1 (16)
where b(z) is the age specic fertility function.
The e¤ect on g of a change in , can be determined by totally di¤erenti-
ating (16):
9This result depends on our assumption that u(c) > 0 independent of age, compared to
zero utility at death. In discussions of life extending treatments this assumption has at times
been questioned.
10Equations (15) and (16) are derived as follows (see Coale (1972): let the current number
of age z females be n(z), while the total number is N . When population grows at a rate g,
the number of females z periods ago was Ne gz: If m is the birth rate, then z periods ago
mNe gz females were born. Given the survival function F (z; );
h(z; ; g) =
n(z)
N
=
Ne gzmF (z; )
N
= me gzF (z; ):
Since
1R
0
h(z; ; g)dz = 1 if follows that the birth rate m is equal to m =
1
1R
0
e gzF (z; )dz : This yields equation (15). By denition, m =
1R
0
h(z; ; g)b(z)dz; where
b(z) is the specic fertility rate at age z. Substituting the above denition of h(z; ; g) we
obtain (16).
10
dg
d
=
1Z
0
e gz
@F (z; )
@
b(z)dz
1Z
0
e gzzF (z; )b(z)dz
< 0: (17)
An increase in longevity raises the steady-state growth rate of the popu-
lation. The magnitude of g depends implicitly on the form of the survival and
fertility functions, F (z; ) and b(z), respectively. It can be solved explicitly
in some special cases. For example, with F (z; ) = e z and b(z) = b > 0;
constant, for all z  0, (16) yields g = b   . The population growth rate is
equal to the di¤erence between the birth rate and the mortality rate. Indeed,
substituting
1
F
@F
@
=  z into (17), we obtain that in this case dg
d
=  1.
Aggregate steady-state savings per capita, S, are
S =
1Z
0
s(z; )h(z; ; g)dz =
from (8)
=
RZ
0
w(z)h(z; ; g)dz   c =
=
RZ
0
w(z)
26666664
e gz
1Z
0
e gzF (z; )dz
  11Z
0
F (z; )dz
37777775 F (z; )dz: (18)
It is seen that S = 0 when g = 0. A stationary economy without popula-
tion growth has no aggregate savings per capita, corresponding to zero personal
lifetime savings. We shall now show that S > 0 when g > 0. Denote average
life expectancy of the population below a certain age, R, by ez(R). From (15),
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ez(R) = RZ
0
e gzzF (z; )dz
, RZ
0
e gzF (z; )dz (19)
The average population age, ez; is
ez = ez(1) = 1Z
0
e gzzF (z; )dz
,1Z
0
e gzF (z; )dz: (20)
Clearly, ez(R) < ez for any R:
Di¤erentiating (18) partially w.r.t. g;
@S
@g
=
0@RZ
0
e gzF (z; )dz
,1Z
0
e gzF (z; )dz
1A (ez   ez(R)) > 0 (21)
A positive population growth rate, g > 0, entails positive aggregate
steady-state savings per capita.
To examine the e¤ect of a change in  on aggregate savings, di¤erentiate
(18) totally,
dS
d
= w(R)h(R; ; g)
dR
d
  dc

d
+
RZ
0
w(z)
dh(z; ; g)
d
dz (22)
We have seen that under Assumption 1,
dR
d
< 0 and
dc
d
> 0: Hence,
when the last term in (22) is non-positive this ensures that
dS
d
< 0:
The sign of
dh(z; ; g)
d
reects two opposite e¤ects: an increase in longevity
raises the survival function at all ages and, as shown above, also raises the pop-
ulation growth rate. The rst e¤ect raises h while the second decreases it. Since
1Z
0
dh(z; ; g)
d
dz = 0; the crucial question is which of these e¤ects is dominant
at di¤erent ages. Since w(z) non-increases in z, it can be seen that the last
term in (22) is negative when
dh
d
is negative for small z and positive for large
z. The interpretation is straightforward: a rise in longevity which raises the
population steady-state density in "working ages", when individuals save, and
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decreases the density in "retirement ages", when individuals dissave, tends
to increase aggregate savings (and vice-versa). This is the Age Composition
E¤ect.
We now provide conditions which ensure that, in steady-state, aggregate
savings increase with longevity. These conditions further highlight the tension
between the opposing e¤ects discussed above.
Two additional assumptions are made:
Assumption 2 The age specic birth rate, b(z), non-increases with age,
b0(z)  0:
Recall that we denote z = 0 as the age when individuals plan for their
future. So this is a natural assumption, certainly at the more advanced ages.
Assumption 3 The elasticity of (z; ) w.r.t. z does not exceed unity,
z
(z; )
@(z; )
@z
 1; for all z11.
Recall that in order to determine that individuals increase their lifetime
expected savings as survival probabilities rise, it was assumed that improve-
ments in longevity are tilted towards older ages (Assumption 1). Taken by
itself, this implies that the populations density function increases proportion-
ately more at older ages. Higher longevity also raises the populations growth
rate. As seen in (15), this leads to a steeper rate of decline of the population
density with age, as the ratio of the size of any two successive age groups rises.
Assumption 3, constraining the rate of increase of survival probabilities with
age, ensures that between these two e¤ects, the latter e¤ect dominates.
We can now state our central result:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, aggregate steady-state savings
rise with longevity,
dS
d
< 0:
11Note that the limiting case which satises this assumption is the exponential function,
F (z; ) = e z; 0  z  1; where z

@
@z
= 1:
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Proof Appendix
It is worth noting that the assumptions underlying Proposition 2, whose
empirical validity can be ascertained, are su¢ cient conditions and hence a
positive relation between longevity and aggregate savings may be found (and
empirically observed) in special cases which do not satisfy some of these as-
sumptions. These conditions ensure, however, that the outcome pertains to a
wide class of individual preferences and survival functions.
5 Example: Exponential Survival Function12
The above expressions can be solved explicitly for the particular survival func-
tion F (z; ) = e z, z  0, a constant wage rate, w(z) = w; and a constant
age specic birth rate, b(z) = b:
Equation (6) becomes
c = w(1  e R) (23)
and (11) and (12) are (in elasticity form):

R
dR
d
=   
 +
Re0(R)
e(R)

eR
   1
R
 (24)

c
dc
d
=
R
eR   1

1 +

R
dR
d

(25)
Clearly,  1  
R
dR
d
 0 and 0  
c
dc
d
 1.
The steady-state age density function, (15), is
h(z; ; g) = (g + )e (g+)z (26)
while the population growth rate, g, with constant birth rate, b, is solved from
12See Sheshinski (2006).
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(16), g = b  . Hence, dg
d
=  1.
Aggregate steady-state savings, (18), are
S = e R

(1  e gR) (27)
Totally di¤erentiating (27),
dS
d
=  we R

1 +

R
dR
d

1  be
 gR


< 0 (28)
6 No Annuitization
It was assumed that annuitization is available at all ages, which means that
individuals can take full advantage of risk pooling. To demonstrate that this is a
critical assumption, consider the case of no insurance13. The budget constraint
(5) now becomes:
1Z
0
c(z)dz  
RZ
0
w(z)dz = 0 (29)
In the absence of insurance, there is also a constraint that assets must be
non-negative at all ages (individuals cannot die with debt). Equating expected
marginal utility across ages yields decreasing optimum consumption, whose
shape reects the individuals degree of risk aversion. To demonstrate that
the e¤ects of a change in longevity on savings and retirement are, in general,
indeterminate, it su¢ ces to take particular utility and survival functions. Thus,
assume that u(c) = ln c and F (z; ) = e z: For a constant wage w(z) = w,
optimum consumption, c^(z), now becomes (instead of (6)):
c^(z) = wR^e z (30)
Accordingly, individual savings, (8), are now:
13Social Security systems provide such annuitization. Mandatory uniform formulas may,
however, be inadequate for some individuals and excessive for others. See Sheshinski (2003,
p. 27-54).
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s^(z) =
8><>:
w(1  R^ e z) 0  z  R^
 wR^ e z R^  z  1
(31)
and optimum retirement is obtained from condition (7):
1
R^
eR^ = e(R^): (32)
For this condition to have a unique solution it is assumed that the L.H.S.
of (32) strictly decreases with R^. This holds i¤ R^ <
1

, i.e. optimum retirement
age is lower than expected lifetime, which is reasonable. When this condition
holds then
dR^
d
 0, that is, as before, an increase in longevity leads to an
increase in retirement age.14
Aggregate steady-state savings, (14), now become:
S = w
"
1  e (g+)R^   R^(g + )
g + 2
#
(33)
Taking into account that
dg
d
=  1, it is seen that, holding R^ constant, a
decrease in  a¤ects S positively. However, when the change in R^ is also taken
into account, the direction of the change in S is indeterminate, depending on
parameter conguration.
7 Unintended Bequests
The analysis in the previous section disregards the fact that in the absence
of full annuitization there are unintended bequests which a¤ect individual be-
havior, in particular individual savings15. A general equilibrium analysis of
14The same condition ensures the non-negativity of assets at all ages
(S(0) = w(1  R) > 0).
15The empirical importance of bequests and intergenerational transfers is debated exten-
sively, among the inconclusive issues is the separation of planned bequests from those due
to lack of annuity markets.
See, for example, Kotliko¤ and Summers (1981) and more recently Kopczuk and Lupton
(2005).
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longevity e¤ects on aggregate savings has to take these intergenerational trans-
fers into account.
In the absence of full annuitization, uncertain lifetime generates a distri-
bution of bequests which depends on survival probabilities. A proper compar-
ison of steady-states with and without annuitization requires derivation of the
ergodic, long-term, distribution of bequests which, in turn, generates a distrib-
ution of individual and aggregate savings. A general analysis of this process is
beyond the scope of this paper. The issue can, however, be claried by means
of a simple example.
Suppose that individuals live one period and with probability p, 0  p  1;
two periods. With no time preference, expected lifetime utility, V; is
V = u(c) + pu(c1) (34)
where c is rst period consumption and c1 is second period consumption.
Without annuities and a zero interest rate, the budget constraint is
c+ c1 = w + b (35)
where w > 0 is income and b  0 is initial endowment. Let u(c) = ln c: Then
optimum consumption, c^ and c^1, is
c^(b) =
w + b
1 + p
; c^1(b) =
p(w + b)
1 + p
(36)
Having no bequest motive, individuals who live two periods leave no be-
quest. Consequently, some individuals will have no initial endowments. Others
will have positive endowments which depend on the history of parental sur-
vivals. In fact, the steady-state distribution of initial endowments is a Renewal
Process.
Denote by b^k the initial endowment of an individual whose k previous
generations of parents lived one period only. If p0 is the probability of a zero
endowment, then the probability of b^k is (1   p)k p0: Since p0
1P
k=0
(1   p)k = 1;
it follows that p0 = p: We can calculate b^k from (38):
b^k = w + b^k 1   c^(b^k 1) =

p
1 + p
+ (
p
1 + p
)2 + :::+ (
p
1 + p
)k

w =
= p

1  ( p
1 + p
)k 1

w k = 1; 2; ::: (37)
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Thus, savings of an individual with endowment b^k; s(b^k); is
s(b^k) = w   c^(b^k) = ( p
1 + p
)k+1 w (38)
and expected total savings, S, is
S = p
1P
k=1
s(b^k)(1  p)k = p
2
1 + p
1P
k=1

p(1  p)
1 + p
k
(39)
While S > 0 for any 0 < p < 1; the sign of the e¤ect on S of an increase
in the survival probability p is indeterminate.
Incorporating a positive birth rate would not change this conclusion: in
the absence of a competitive annuity market, the e¤ect of increased longevity
on steady-state aggregate savings is indeterminate.
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Appendix
From (15),
dh(z; ; g)
d

h(z; ; g) =
1
m
dm
d
  h(z; ; g)z dg
d
+
+h(z; ; g)(z; ): (A.1)
Since m = 1
,1Z
0
e gzF (z; )dz ;
1
m
dm
d
=
0@1Z
0
h(z; ; g)zdz
1A dg
d
 
1Z
0
h(z; ; g)(z; )dz (A.2)
Substituting from (17), (A.2) can be rewritten
1
m
dm
d
= A
1Z
0
b(z)'(z; ; g)dz (A.3)
where
A =
0@1Z
0
h(z; ; g)zdz
1A0@1Z
0
h(z; ; g)(z; )dz
1A
1Z
0
h(z; ; g)zb(z)dz
< 0 (A.4)
and
'(z; ; g) =
h(z; ; g)(z; )
1Z
0
h(z; ; g)(z; )dz
  h(z; ; g)z1Z
0
h(z; ; g)zdz
(A.5)
Since
1Z
0
'(z; ; g)dz = 0; ' changes sign at least once, say at z = ~z: At
this point, by (A.5),
(~z; )
1Z
0
h(z; ; g)(z; )dz
=
~z
1Z
0
h(z; ; g)zdz
(A.6)
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Di¤erentiating ' w.r.t. z is, at ~z;
'0(~z; ; g) =
@(~z; )
@z
1Z
0
h(z; ; g)(z; )dz
  11Z
0
h(z; ; g)zdz
=
inserting from (A.6)
=
(~z; )
~z
1Z
0
h(z; ; g)(z; )dz

~z
(~z; )
@(~z; )
@z
  1

(A.7)
It follows from Assumption 3 that
'0(~z; ; g)  0: (A.8)
With strict inequality, (A.8) implies that ~z is unique and that
'(~z; ; g) R 0 as z Q ~z (A.9)
By Assumption 2, b0(z)  0: Hence, by (A.9),
1Z
0
b(z)'(z; ; g)dz  b(~z)
1Z
0
'(z; ; g)dz = 0 (A.10)
In view of (A.3), we conclude that
1
m
dm
d
 0:
Since
1Z
0
dh(z; ; g)
d
dz = 0;
dh
d
is either 0 for all z or changes sign at least
once, say at z^: From (A.1), at z^;
1
m
dm
d
  h(z^; ; g)(z^ dg
d
  (z^; )) = 0 (A.11)
Since
1
m
dm
d
 0; it follows that
z^
dg
d
  (z^; )  0 (A.12)
Partially di¤erentiating h(z; ; g) w.r.t. z at z = z^ is, by (A.1),
@
@z

dh(z^; ; g)
d

=  h(z^; ; g)

dg
d
  @(z^; ; g)
@z

(A.13)
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from (A.12) and Assumption 3,
  h(z^; ; g)(z^; )
z^

1  z^
(z^; )
@(z^; )
@z

 0 (A.14)
Hence, unless
dh
d
= 0 for all z, z^ is unique and
dh(z; ; g)
d
Q 0 as z Q z^ (A.15)
Since w(z) non-increases and
1Z
0
dh(z; ; g)
d
dz = 0; it now follows from
(A.15) that for any R;
1Z
0
w(z)
dh(z; ; g)
d
dz  0 (A.16)
Recapitulating, by Assumption 1,
dR
d
< 0 and
dc
d
> 0: Going back to
(22), we see that together with (A.16), this establishes that
dS
d
< 0 k :
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